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A NEW STRATEGIC AGE AND A NEW LOOK AT U.S. 
NUCLEAR STRATEGY 
 
he present role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign 
policy is as a deterrent against possible enemies. 
However, as the modern security environment 
changes, the United States needs to rebalance its 
strategic ends, ways, and means. The current U.S. nuclear 
force structure is a triad consisting of three delivery legs:  
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), bombers, and 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). This triad is 
a Cold War legacy, created to contain the violent expansion 
of Soviet power in Europe and Asia, and designed to provide 
a survivable first and second strike capability in the event of 
a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Although never tested 
in battle, the triad operated as a flexible, credible strategy for 
national decision makers. The United States is now more 
than two decades past the ending of the Cold War, but still 
maintains the same nuclear force structure developed to 
counter the Soviet threat in a conventional bipolar global 
conflict. With no more Soviet Union, the United States now 
faces a greater preponderance of small state adversaries, 
proliferation, and terrorist groups with nuclear ambitions, 
issues that U.S. foreign policy minimally considered during 
the Cold War.  
The changing security environment raises the 
question of whether or not the United States still needs a 
nuclear triad. During the 2011 defense budget debate, former 
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated that the possible 
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its land-based nuclear ICBM program, pressuring Congress 
into granting the Department of Defense a more favorable 
budget.1 According to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, “at some point in the future, 
certainly I think a decision will have to be made in terms of 
whether we keep the triad or drop it down to a dyad.”2  Some 
military leaders are beginning to see the triad as an 
unsustainable force structure, especially as each delivery 
system comes due for modernization. The former Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman General James Cartwright 
stated, “The challenge here is that we have to recapitalize all 
three legs [of the nuclear triad], and we don’t have the money 
to do it.”3 General John Adams believes, “this budget debate 
should not be viewed as a catastrophe for national security; 
rather it represents an opportunity to seriously review our 
national security strategy.”4   
The political debate raises strategic questions. What 
is the role of the nuclear weapon in contemporary U.S. 
security strategy?  Why does the U.S. still have a triad?  Can 
the United States achieve its strategic ends if ICBMs are 
removed from the force structure?  The 2010 Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR) defines the role of nuclear weapons in 
national defense, but does not dictate what force structure 
would best achieve U.S. strategic ends: 
 
As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States 
will maintain safe, secure, and effective nuclear 
forces, including deployed and stockpiled nuclear 
weapons, highly capable nuclear delivery systems 
and command and control capabilities, and the 
physical infrastructure and the expert personnel 
needed to sustain them.5 
 
Does this force structure still adequately address modern 
nuclear threats, or should American policy makers take 
another look at how to best maintain deterrence against a 
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new variety of enemies, assuming that deterrence is still the 
primary political aim? 
 The elimination of ICBMs as a nuclear delivery 
system has implications on broader nuclear weapons issues 
as well. President Barack Obama has defined nuclear 
nonproliferation and disarmament as common international 
goals. The United States has been a champion of global 
nonproliferation since the signing of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in 1970, and has recently adopted a Nuclear Zero 
agenda for the twenty-first century. Ever since dropping the 
first atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United 
States has viewed its nuclear arsenal as a symbol of power 
and prestige in the international community. However, the 
United States has never seen its nuclear military force as a 
strategic end in itself. Instead, nuclear weapons are perceived 
as operational means through which doctrines, such as 
massive retaliation or nuclear diplomacy, can achieve the 
ultimate strategic and political ends. A vital component of 
reducing nuclear weapons globally is removing the badge of 
power associated with a state or actor possessing a nuclear 
weapon.  
 The process of quantifying risk in defense policy is 
tricky. In this paper, the argument will first look at U.S. 
nuclear strategic ends today and the process by which the 
modern nuclear strategy and force structure developed 
throughout the Cold War under the doctrine of deterrence. 
Understanding that the strategic nuclear means have 
developed as a response to balancing threats and domestic 
resources, I will explain in detail the existing nuclear triad in 
order to distinguish the particular capabilities of each leg and 
the impact of the triad as a whole. From there, the existing 
Cold War force structure will be measured against the 
modern security environment and the various actors within it. 
Finally, ICBMs as a nuclear platform will be analyzed 
according to deterrence and the modern security threats to 
see if a nuclear dyad is capable of maintaining reliability and 
credibility without the land-based leg. 
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Purpose and Structure of the Nuclear Triad 
 
 The United States has approximately 800 strategic 
alert warheads, including 450 ICBM warheads and 384 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on four 
ballistic missile submarines.6 The balance of three launch 
platforms ensures survivability for a second strike, accuracy 
in deployment, and crisis control. The current defense 
posture focuses on maximizing the time in which the 
President may decide to use a nuclear strike. As the triad 
stands now, the “heavy bombers [are] off full-time alert, 
nearly all ICBMs on alert, and a significant number of 
SLBNs at sea at any given time,” according to the 2010 
NPR.7  If necessary, however, nuclear bombers can be put 
into orbit, more submarines can maneuver within range of 
any target on Earth, and nuclear ICBMs can acquire new 
targets. Destroying every U.S. strategic nuclear warhead is 
virtually impossible. 
Nuclear bombers possess the ability to go almost 
anywhere in the world and are highly visible. While they 
may be unable to penetrate deep into enemy territory, they 
can be forward deployed as a threatening signal to an 
adversary. Strategic tools such as signaling and extended 
deterrence depend on such visibility. The 2010 NPR 
describes this capability as necessary to “strengthen 
deterrence of potential adversaries and [signal] assurance of 
allies and partners.”8  Currently, the United States maintains 
military bases and airfields on nearly every continent, from 
Europe to the Middle East to Asia, meaning that very few 
places in the world are unreachable by the U.S. military. By 
keeping the weapons airborne during a crisis, the bombers 
enhance their survivability.  
With fourteen nuclear-capable Ohio-class submarines 
under the control of the Navy, the SLBM force is the most 
survivable of the three legs. According to current doctrine 
and posture, approximately half of the fleet at any given time 
will remain forward deployed in the Atlantic and Pacific 
96  
 
oceans.9 The SLBN force virtually assures reliability in 
deterrence—the technology in such systems is the most 
advanced in the world. While expensive, the United States’ 
capabilities with the submarine force represent the height of 
nuclear advancement. These nuclear-enabled submarines can 
strike nearly anywhere in the world from changing and 
hidden positions, making an enemy attack unlikely.  
Intercontinental ballistic missiles offer decision 
makers the ability to strike a fatal blow to another state from 
friendly borders. Having the ability to reach out and touch 
another country without ever leaving the security of your 
own territory is a powerful tool. According to national 
policy, the greatest benefits of the nuclear ICBM force 
include “extremely secure command and control, high 
readiness rates, and relatively low operating costs.”10  
Additionally, American allies can host a nuclear weapon 
launch pad within their own borders at relatively little cost to 
the United States, as in Europe. Nuclear ICBMs are currently 
the least expensive leg to maintain; however, it is also the 
least survivable, least flexible, and least likely leg to 
contribute in a nuclear conflict. Additionally, ICBM silos 
provide a tempting target to possible U.S. enemies. 
According to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START treaty), the United States will soon undergo the 
process of “DeMIRVing” every nuclear missile, meaning 
that each missile will only be capable of carrying a single 
warhead.11  Russia and the United States intend to “enhance 
the stability of the nuclear balance by reducing the incentives 
for either side to strike first” 12 However, this further reduces 
the relevance of nuclear ICBMs. 
Political and military leaders have a variety of 
opinions on the subject of ICBMs and the nuclear triad, but 
both have received strong support from various quarters. The 
Air Force Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander, 
C. Robert Kehler, states, “I believe that a triad of force 
makes the most strategic sense, make the most operational 
sense and ultimately is the right way to go forward today.”13  
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He warns that the question of ridding, or even not 
modernizing, each leg of the nuclear triad “are not all 
questions for today.”14 The 2010 NPR also supports 
maintaining the triad because of its flexibility, dependability, 
and responsiveness. Each system, according to the report, 
can cover the technical difficulties of the others. Overall, the 
nuclear triad as a system, created to combat the Cold War 
threat, does offer an incredible amount of survivability and 
accuracy, as well as maximizing presidential decision time.  
 
U.S. Nuclear Strategy 
 
The maximum number of nuclear weapons in U.S. 
possession at any point in time was reached at the end of 
1967, when the United States counted 31,255 weapons.15  As 
of late September 2009, the United States possessed 5,113 
nuclear weapons, a 75 percent decrease from the end of the 
Cold War, with a 90 percent decrease in non-strategic 
nuclear weapons.16  According to the New START treaty, 
strategic warheads currently number at 1,720 and, by 2018, 
would go to a 1,550 warhead ceiling, with approximately 
3,000 reserve and tactical nuclear weapons.17  In the 
beginning of his second term, however, President Obama 
indicated a drop to 1,000 strategic warheads and 1,500 
reserves, a decision possibly related to the 2013 budget 
sequester. Although treaties and policies talk of warhead 
numbers, the true strategic decision will be what the Obama 
administration cuts within the existing triad.  
During the 2010 NPR, Dr. James N. Miller, recently 
appointed as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
emphasized that, “an effective national strategy for reducing 
nuclear dangers and sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent are 
long-term challenges that will require support from a long 
succession of U.S. administrations and Congresses.”18 
According to White House policy, President Obama’s 




Reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons by 
those states that already possess nuclear weapons, 
starting first with Russia and the U.S.; to prevent 
additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons 
by strengthening the international non-proliferation 
regime and by holding accountable those states that 
have violated their obligations, such as Iran and 
North Korea; to prevent nuclear terrorism by 
securing vulnerable nuclear materials and 
strengthening international cooperation on nuclear 
security; and, to develop new mechanisms to support 
the growth of safe and secure nuclear power in ways 
that reduce the spread of dangerous technologies.19 
 
The president’s initial strategic goal in 2009 focused on both 
reducing the global nuclear arsenal and keeping a “safe, 
secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary.”20. 
Throughout his first term, President Obama has advanced his 
policy of nonproliferation more publicly than his nuclear 
deterrence policy, such as his renegotiation of the New 
START with Russia in the fall of 2010.   
In maintaining security, the two greatest nuclear 
threats to the United States are nuclear terrorism and nuclear 
proliferation.21  The perception of the threat environment has 
changed dramatically in the two decades of the post-Cold 
War era. In a bipolar world, the greatest threat was the 
massive Soviet nuclear arsenal and an unstable political 
order. Today, Russia is seen as a key strategic ally with 
common nuclear goals. Because the threat of nuclear 
terrorism is of great concern to all states, the United States 
maintains a strong position to pursue aggressive 
nonproliferation.  
Nuclear nonproliferation has not always been a 
national priority. In the final days of World War II, world 
leaders took stock of the atomic bomb’s destructive power. 
According to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 
nuclear weapons were not the shiny new symbol of 
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American power. Instead, they represented, “a change in the 
international environment so likely to undermine national 
security that [they] must be resisted.” Kissinger’s warning, 
however, was ignored.22  Although historical advances in 
technology and weaponry reshaped the battlefield, nuclear 
weapons redefined warfare. A nation could now 
indiscriminately destroy its enemy without leaving its own 
borders. How could policymakers and heads of state ‘resist’ 
such weapons? Would states still be willing to engage in a 
great power war when the nuclear means could devastate 
civilization? Policymakers soon adopted deterrence, the new 
national policy that would guide most national security 
decisions.  The United States, Soviet Union, and several 
others determined that the risk was acceptable when the 
perceived alternative was total destruction. Understanding 
these priorities, states began to arm themselves. Throughout 
the Cold War, each president, from Truman to Reagan and 
Bush, approached nuclear strategy differently, although with 
strands of continuity. According to Stephen Cimbala, an 
expert on security and nuclear arms control, nuclear weapons 
have always a form of “armed persuasion,” also known as 
nuclear diplomacy.23   
 Nuclear deterrence is the ability of a state to prevent 
another actor from engaging in a particular action based on a 
threat of nuclear force. For the state employing nuclear 
deterrence theory in practice, political leaders aim to make 
the cost of an attack too high for enemies who may 
contemplate nuclear or conventional aggression. The nuclear 
bomb was originally meant to enhance military capability in 
executing war, but, as strategic author Bernard Brodie has 
noted, nuclear weapons instead changed the overall purpose 
of national security policies and forces:  “Thus far, the chief 
purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. 
From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can 
have no other useful purpose.”24  The U.S. military could no 
longer be a chiefly aggressive actor. American security 
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strategy would now be primarily concerned with defense 
from the possible destruction.  
 To achieve this end via deterrence, the U.S. needed 
to acquire a nuclear force structure that would serve both an 
operational and political signaling purpose, resulting in the 
concept of the nuclear triad. The balance of the three 
purposes varied based on the priorities of the president at the 
time. Truman valued both war-fighting and deterrent 
signaling, and thus built up a nuclear force in conjunction 
with conventional forces. Eisenhower valued the political 
signal above the enormous cost of maintaining operational 
capacity, and thus focused on nuclear numbers in his doctrine 
of massive retaliation. Kennedy, who would experience both 
the Cuban Missile Crisis and the beginning of Vietnam, 
sought a balance between the two, but eventually emphasized 
operational feasibility above a continued missile buildup. 
These policy changes, during the course of the triad’s 
development, resulted in both a massive, quick expansion of 
warheads available and the methodical, slower development 
of new delivery platforms. As the means changed, though, 
the doctrine of deterrence remained constant throughout the 
Cold War and into the present. 
 In order for deterrence to be effective in preventing a 
nuclear attack by an enemy actor, the American nuclear 
regime would need to demonstrate both reliability and 
credibility, a balance postulated in the 1950s by Brodie, one 
of the first major intellectuals of deterrence theory during the 
Cold War.25  Reliability refers to the capability to carry out 
an accurate strike of sufficient size to impose heavy enough 
costs to outweigh the adversary’s possible gains from 
aggression, while credibility refers to the commitment of 
political leaders to give the order for such a nuclear attack 
instead of just threatening to do so. According to former 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a pioneer of deterrence 
in policy, “power never achieves its maximum possibility as 
a deterrent of crime unless those criminal instincts have 
reason to fear that [it] will actually be used against them.”26  
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If a nation fails to demonstrate and effectively give others the 
perception that an accurate nuclear attack is both militarily 
reliable and politically credible, then an enemy actor would 
not be adequately convinced that the American nuclear attack 
is a viable threat to their own nation.  
 The primary challenge in maintaining deterrence as a 
national security strategy is that the policy’s ultimate success 
depends on the mind of the enemy. If the enemy does not 
believe the threat, then deterrence has failed, no matter what 
deterrent actions were taken. To one actor, the threat of an 
American nuclear bomb destroying a capitol city or their 
physical military sites may be enough to deter aggression. 
However, to other actors, the threat against one city may not 
be enough. The U.S. must convince possible enemies that the 
American military threat, whether through one bomb or a 
comprehensive missile shield, is too great a price for any 
aggressive action. 
Today, American political and military strategists 
must develop a nuclear force structure that addresses a 
variety of threats and actors. There is no longer a single 
nuclear threat, as in the Cold War. Policymakers must also 
answer to the American domestic concern. What force 
structure will provide enough security against foreign 
threats?  While the executive branch is ultimately responsible 
for the nation’s defenses, Congress and the public are critical 
players in the allocation of funds for defense ventures. 
Therefore, because of the high price tag associated with the 
development of nuclear technology, the nuclear policy must 
also balance against limited national resources. And in 
answering to military, technical, and political leaders 
themselves, the nuclear security strategy must be both a war-
fighting strategy and political deterrent strategy. The answer 
to each of these concerns depends on the current 
administrations balance of priorities. The 2010 Nuclear 
Posture Review emphasized the need for political continuity 
in adherence to a nuclear policy, based on the fact that any 
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policy would require more than just the four or eight years of 
a single president’s term.27   
National Security Council Report 68, a landmark 
resolution that established containment of the Soviet Union 
as the sine qua non of American foreign policy, resulted in 
new military policies focused on maintaining global security 
nearly everywhere as opposed to focusing on one area first.28  
This is significant because the document began influencing 
policy when the Korean War broke out in 1950. MacArthur 
even advocated for tactical nuclear strikes against the North 
Korean and Chinese forces. While never implemented, the 
proposed strikes demonstrate how the weapons at the time 
were still only appreciated in the context of a wider, 
conventional military doctrine.  
After the aggressive nuclear and military buildup of 
Truman’s NSC-68, President Eisenhower reverted to a 
greater focus on nuclear diplomacy as a way to balance the 
Soviet threat against limited U.S. national resources. 
Eisenhower worried about the stresses placed on the 
American economy and industrial complex via a mass arms 
buildup. As a way to balance war-fighting strategy with 
ideological battle, the President focused on building a 
substantial nuclear force structure as a means to deter enemy 
aggression, but did not counterbalance with a substantial 
buildup of conventional military forces, coining the term 
“nuclear diplomacy.”  
Eisenhower defined vital interests separately from 
peripheral interests. John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s 
Secretary of State, elaborated on the change in policy 
implementation by determining that the new policy would 
depend on the “deterrent of massive retaliatory power” as the 
primary defense, a strategy that relied fully on deterrence.29  
Dulles expanded with the following analogy:   
 
We keep locks on our doors, but we do not have an 
armed guard in every home. We rely principally on a 
community security system so well equipped to 
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punish any who break in and steal that, in fact, 
would-be aggressors are generally deterred. That is 
the modern way of getting maximum protection at 
bearable cost.30 
 
The Eisenhower administration pursued a new force 
structure by cutting back on ground forces and investing in 
nuclear technology and delivery methods, such as hydrogen 
bomb technology and the new intercontinental jet bombers.31  
Where Truman favored symmetry by building up both 
conventional and nuclear assets, Eisenhower favored 
asymmetry through uncertainty in how exactly his 
administration would respond to any particular aggressive 
action. The U.S. military force structure shifted to favoring 
development of naval and air force assets, two areas which 
promised to provide America with the greatest advantage 
over any other nation. U.S. allies could be depended on to fill 
in ground forces if the need arose.32  The U.S. itself would 
aggressively pursue an expanded missile arsenal, including 
both ICBMs, SLBMs and intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles (IRBMs).33  Deterrence was the primary “way”, or 
operational doctrine, of protecting the U.S. from attack, but 
the variance in technical capabilities, to be used on a tactical 
level of war, were to enhance the reliability and credibility of 
the U.S. nuclear threat. As the U.S. developed the ability to 
strike a wider range of targets with less lead-time and less 
risk to American defense personnel, the reach of the 
American nuclear arm extended to cover early every corner 
of the world. 
 Fundamentally disagreeing with Eisenhower’s logic 
and policies, President John F. Kennedy again changed the 
direction of the U.S. security strategy. He framed his policies 
around a strategy of ‘flexible response,’ in which the 
Department of Defense would again build a military 
balanced between nuclear and conventional capabilities in 
order to allow the U.S. greater flexibility in responding to 
different security threats.  
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REVIEWING DETERRENCE TODAY 
 
 Deterrence in a bipolar world had a very clear-cut 
definition – make your enemies think that you have a more 
survivable and reliable nuclear force structure than they do in 
order to keep them from attacking you first. Specifically, 
convince them that they will not be able to destroy your 
second strike capability with their first strike, which would 
leave them vulnerable to a retaliatory strike. Throughout the 
Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had landed, 
immobile point targets at which to aim. If an attack was 
imminent, they each knew where the other’s missile silos 
were located and approximately how many missiles to 
expect. They knew where to attack and where to defend. A 
unipolar world, however, has presented the U.S. with a new 
series of threats in a new globalized environment. Very few 
immobile point targets exist. As stated throughout the 2010 
Nuclear Posture Review, the threat of nuclear war on a 
global scale has decreased, but the risk of experiencing a 
nuclear attack has never been higher due to the threat of non-
state actors using terrorism as operational doctrine.34  The 
U.S. must now maintain a security strategy that responds to a 
multitude of nuclear threats; the traditional strategy of 
deterrence and the nuclear triad may not be the most 
effective answer to each threat. While most rational states 
possess the same ultimate goals – survival, defense, and 
providing for the welfare of its people – how should the U.S. 
respond to actors that do not possess those same goals, such 
as a terrorist organization or insular regime?  Before 
analyzing the proper cohesive strategy, policymakers must 
first understand each possible nuclear threat and the 
environment in which they operate. 
 
Post-Cold War Threat Environment 
 
As the world moved into the 21st Century, lacking 
any global wars or conflicts and enjoying unprecedented 
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stability in global order, many began to believe that the 
ending of the twentieth century, most violent century in 
history, had buried its ghosts with its outdated calendars. The 
Soviet Union had collapsed, removing the existential threat 
upon which U.S. defense doctrine and the logic of the 
nuclear triad had been based. The terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 
2001, fundamentally changed U.S. security strategy and 
redefined the major issues of the international community. 
With the rise of globalism and technology, the global 
environment is more dynamic and complex than at any other 
point in history, due to the increased access that every actor 
has to every other actor. Even with a new threat, however, 
the U.S. has maintained the nuclear triad as its force structure 
even though very few conflicts involve nuclear issues or 
would justify any type of nuclear response. Without the 
Soviet Union, the U.S. has yet to take a comprehensive look 
at the nuclear force structure in a way that matches 
capabilities with possible threats. How should our nuclear 
means adjust to match our adapting political goals? 
The collapse of the Soviet Union has opened the 
nuclear agenda to a variety of other issues, including 
nonproliferation, arms control, and nuclear terrorism. World 
leaders hoped for a “nuclear marginalization” after the end of 
the Cold War.35  While wars and conflicts would always 
continue, perhaps nuclear weapons could be so marginalized 
that they would cease to be a significant factor in national 
defense strategies. While many nations have adopted ‘no first 
use’ and ‘no nuclear attacks on non-nuclear states’ policies,36 
nuclear weapons still remain one of the most dangerous, 
relevant, and volatile threats within the world. Cimbala, in a 
fashion similar to current U.S. military doctrine, defines the 
threat in terms of overarching nuclear goals:  “nuclear 
deterrence and arms control; anti-nuclear defenses; and 
nuclear proliferation.”37  According to the “National Strategy 
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” based on the 
classified National Security Presidential Directive 17, the 
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official U.S. policy in approaching all WMDs focuses on 
counter proliferation, nonproliferation, and WMD 
consequence management, known as the “3 Pillars.”38  
However, the strategy should also be determined according 
to the current threats and the political goals associated with 
those threats.  
For the U.S. nuclear regime, policy makers are 
concerned with three particular actors:  legitimate nuclear 
states, such as China or Russia; rogue states, such as Iran and 
North Korea; and non-state actors, such as Al Qaeda. 
However, I have added a category – ‘grey states’ – to occupy 
the ill-defined place between legitimate nuclear states and 
rogue states. The criteria for the identification and 
composition of each of these categories is based on how U.S. 
policy has addressed and currently addresses these actors 
from a state and military policy perspective. Each of these 
threats present particular challenges to U.S. and international 
security, as well as variations in what types of policies will 
be effective against each actor. Nearly every one of the states 
listed below, excepting France and Great Britain, could 
qualify for entry into a different category based on actions, 
outside relationships, treaty and institutional participation, 
and their own domestic goals. The categorization is in no 
way meant to overly simplify these states’ positions in the 
international system, but attempts to analyze possible threats 
that could require a nuclear response from the U.S. 
 
Legitimate Nuclear States 
 
 Countries considered ‘legitimate nuclear states’ 
include only those listed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
established in 1968: the United States, Russia, Great Britain, 
France, and China. While other states with recognized 
nuclear regimes also exist, these five states were the first to 
develop nuclear programs and have been involved in the 
development of international nuclear treaties and institutions 
from the onset of the nuclear age. Additionally, these states 
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are known as the P5 – the five states with permanent seats 
and veto power on the United Nations Security Council. 
France and Great Britain maintain relatively small symbolic 
nuclear stockpiles, and have adopted strategies that typically 
compliment American nuclear doctrine and means. Most 
importantly, though, these two states are not threats, in a 
manner that would be applicable to nuclear deterrence, 
because of their close political relationships with the United 
States. This section will focus on Russia and China, who 
present greater uncertainty with regard to future actions vis-
à-vis the United States. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 
notes these two countries in particular as being the two states 
most necessary to maintaining global nuclear stability and 
forwarding the nonproliferation movement. 
 The greatest enemy of the United States for over half 
of a century, Russia is the only other major state with a 
substantial nuclear stockpile. Vladimir Putin, current 
president of Russia, recently asserted that Russia still 
possesses the capability of destroying the United States in “a 
half hour or less.”39  The two nations now have a favorable, 
cooperative relationship regarding their shared interests in 
nonproliferation and preventing nuclear terrorism.40  Russia 
and the United States recently reinvigorated their nuclear 
relationship with the signing of the New Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (New START), which would further 
reduce nuclear stockpiles, deployed warheads, and delivery 
systems.41  Even with the assurances of economic and 
political interconnectedness, though, the sheer size of the 
Russian arsenal continues to be a driving factor in U.S. 
nuclear policy. While the U.S. relationship with Russia is 
significantly more stable than that with the former Soviet 
Union, American strategists cannot discount the massive 
capability of the Russian nuclear force structure. Russia as a 
successor state of the Soviet Union still may present a threat 
requiring a deterrent response, but the extensive political and 
institutional relationships that have developed between the 
United States and Russia in the past two decades have 
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increased transparency and highlighted similar political 
goals. Both states are decreasing their nuclear stockpiles, 
indicating that the weapons race has ceased. 
 With regard to China, the United States is concerned 
with the pace and character of its military development, as 
well as the lack of transparency around its nuclear 
development and doctrine.42  Based on a 2006 Defense White 
Paper, analyst Jianqun Teng identified three pillars of 
China’s nuclear policy that serve to support the argument 
that China is a willing partner in disarmament and 
nonproliferation:  first, that nuclear weapons are only a last 
resort in war; second, that only the minimum nuclear 
capability for self-defense will be developed and maintained; 
and third, that disarmament and international stability among 
the nuclear powers is paramount.43  While the United States 
and Russia still possess the greatest nuclear arsenals, they 
will eventually need to engage the three other NPT nuclear 
states for disarmament as the disparity between arsenals 
decreases. China has indicated diplomatically that it is 
willing to engage in such disarmament talks and actions as 
long as the other nuclear states act in kind. China’s clear 
priority is in maintaining a stable balance of power among 
the nuclear states. Because China’s relationship with the U.S. 
in the future is still unclear and unsecured with a lack of 
treaties, institutions, and a solid political relationship, the 
U.S. is warranted in keeping a deterrent force in place. 
 American strategists have faced the issue of 
balancing power between the five legitimate nuclear 
weapons states since the signing of the NPT in 1968, 
indicating that few strategic shifts are necessary beyond what 
policies have already been implemented. Russia and China, 
along with France and Great Britain, all share very similar 
strategic interests with the United States, making cooperation 
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Rogue States 
 
 The rogue states in the international nuclear regime, 
according to U.S. policy, are characterized as being 
aggressive pursuers of nuclear weapons programs that goes 
against their original agreement and signing of the NPT. The 
United States is primarily concerned with North Korea and 
Iran. Other states that used to be considered rogue, until their 
proliferation programs were confirmed to have ended, 
include Libya and Iraq. The ability of these states to pursue 
nuclear power serves as the most destabilizing factor in the 
nuclear relationships between the Western powers and 
Russia and China, as indicated most recently in the tension 
between the United States and Russia over Iran. 
 Two states, Iran and North Korea, best represent the 
‘rogue state’ identification in the modern security 
environment. They are not failed states – both still possess 
functioning governments with consolidated control and 
legitimacy within their borders. American policy identifies 
these two regimes as extreme – one lead by religious 
fundamentalists, and the other by a military dictatorship.  
Modern Iran began pursuing nuclear energy in the 
1985, in the middle of the Iran-Iraq War.44  The past two and 
a half decades have been shrouded in secrecy, with the 
Iranians activating their weaponization program multiple 
times. The Iranians have always asserted that they only 
pursue nuclear energy for civilian purposes, but the 
revelation of several unannounced nuclear facilities and 
programs, along with certain technological practices, has 
made the United States suspicious of a militarized program 
intent on creating a bomb. Iran possesses several types of 
missiles, although none capable of striking U.S. soil. Critical 
U.S. interests and resources, such as the Strait of Hormuz 
and U.S. military bases in the Middle East, are within reach, 
not to mention Israel, whose very existence is an anathema to 
the fundamentalist Iranian regime. 
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 Iran is still a member of the NPT, meaning that any 
militarized pursuit of nuclear weapons violates one of the 
most fundamental principles of the treaty, namely that non-
nuclear states will not become nuclear. Although Iran is a 
member of the NPT, French scholar Thèrese Delpech gives 
us three reasons why the country may pursue nuclear power:  
first, for civilian purposes only; second, as a bargaining tool 
with the United States and other powers; third, to obtain a 
nuclear weapon.45  Delpech asserts that Iran possesses 
“indisputable military nuclear ambitions,” but does not 
necessarily want a direct confrontation with the United 
States.46  Dr. John Mearsheimer argues instead that Iran is 
currently in its most powerful position.47  Acquiring a 
nuclear bomb would leave Iran open to an attack from a 
number of actors that would be unwilling to grant it a 
position of power over the region – Israel and Saudi Arabia 
are two notable examples – and possibly spark a regional 
nuclear arms race. By sitting on the cusp of nuclear 
weaponization, Iran can enjoy all of the benefits of 
deterrence without the heavy costs. Such a strategy still 
comes with costs, and Iran has suffered from additional 
economic and political sanctions, particularly on its oil. 
Increased political pressure has also affected its relationships 
with Russia and China, whose support is critical for the 
survival of its nuclear program.  
The other major actor characterized as a rogue state 
is North Korea. North Korea has possessed a militarized 
nuclear weapons program since the 1980s.48  While 
originally a signatory of the NPT, the politically isolated 
state withdrew in accordance with its weaponization. 
Surrounded by three of the world’s foremost nuclear powers, 
the North Korean regime sees its nuclear arsenal as a 
mechanism through which it can consolidate power and 
survive in a precarious region. Attempts at negotiation, 
including one as recently as 2012, have failed to temper 
North Korea’s aggressive brinkmanship with regard to 
nuclear testing, missile proliferation, and engagements with 
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South Korea. The isolated country has made significant 
contributions to the proliferation of missile and nuclear 
technology, linking with the A.Q. Khan network, Iran, Libya, 
Pakistan, and more.49 The United States has chosen to 
respond with limited aggressive action. A large military force 
has been stationed in South Korea since the end of the 
Korean War, but presidents and their administrations have 
chosen to stick to negotiations. American deterrence and 
strong use of signaling, particularly with military and nuclear 
assets, have likely played a large part in the current 
relationship. 
What threats do rogue states such as Iran and North 
Korea, who choose to operate outside of accepted 
international institutions and norms, pose to the United States 
in the 21st century?  The primary concerns of these states 
actually tend to center on regional power politics. Both states 
are located in highly volatile regions, and both states see the 
current balance of power as a threat to their survival. When a 
state feels that its survival is at risk and institutions have 
failed to satiate its need for security, it will turn to hard-
power options, such as military and nuclear force, to provide 
security. These rogue states see a nuclear program as a hedge 
against instability and more powerful states. Neither Iran nor 
North Korea possesses the resources to match the vast 
conventional capabilities of the United States, so nuclear 
power provides the key to a degree of power parity. 
 
Grey States:  Pakistan, India, and Israel 
 
 Several states exist that are considered neither 
legitimate nuclear powers nor rogue regimes from the 
security perspective of the United States. Each of these states 
refused to sign the NPT upon its release, on principal, and 
have also developed their own nuclear capabilities while 
remaining an active participant in the international 
community. These states include India, Pakistan, and Israel.  
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 India, as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, has 
clearly dictated a strong, principle-based stance against the 
perceived exclusionary nature of the NPT and the modern 
nuclear environment. India has adopted a doctrine of 
“minimum deterrence”, whereby it perceives its nuclear 
assets as political tools instead of operational war-fighting 
assets.50  What India does possess currently lies in bits and 
pieces of assembly, but the country has committed to a “No 
First Use” policy and, as a possible response doctrine, 
‘massive retaliation’.51 Rajesh Basrur, in an analysis of 
India’s nuclear doctrine for a NATO study, sees the state’s 
“strategic culture” as “a pattern of thought and action” that is 
“minimalistic in its (reluctant) acceptance of nuclear strategy 
and incrementalist in acting upon it.”52  According to Basrur, 
India’s nuclear posture is minimalist, but, due to the number 
of players and the somewhat murky relationships between 
the government and the military powers, political and 
military leaders still possess the ability to expand their 
operational nuclear capabilities. 
 India and the United States have fostered a symbiotic 
nuclear relationship. In 2008, President George W. Bush 
pioneered the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Deal, which solidified 
a detailed security framework based on the Additional 
Protocol to the NPT in exchange for greater technology and 
resource access for India. India and Pakistan have 
demonstrated that, while capable of being pushed to the 
brink, neither state is willing to release the first nuclear 
punch. India and China have demonstrated the ability to 
negotiate and now have a prosperous, friendly relationship 
based on economic trade. India possesses a formative, 
conventional military and is more likely to favor 
conventional conflict resolution of the nuclear option, given 
its participation in the Non-Aligned Movement. 
Another current “gray state,” Pakistan, could, in the 
near future, surpass both the U.K. and France as “the fourth 
largest nuclear weapons state.”53  This threatens President 
Obama’s commitment to reducing nuclear stockpiles and 
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would further complicate future arms negotiations, especially 
among the five legitimate nuclear powers. The U.S. has 
invested over $100 million in strengthening Pakistani 
security assets and skills. The United States has a vested 
interest in maintaining the security of Pakistan’s nuclear 
stockpiles and resources. However, this intense U.S. interest 
has many Pakistani officials worried that the United States is 
actually attempting to steal or gain control of Pakistani 
nuclear resources. 
U.S. policymakers are especially concerned about the 
U.S.-Pakistan relationship, given current U.S. military 
operations in neighboring Afghanistan. If not properly 
prioritized, the lack of security around parts of the Pakistani 
nuclear program could allow an extremist group to gain 
control of valuable nuclear material. Such material could be 
sold to an enemy of the United States or used against it by 
groups that see the United States as an existential threat to 
their survival. Additionally, Pakistan still lacks effective 
internal institutional stability, making policy formation and 
accountability difficult. Finally, the disputed province of 
Kashmir has proven to be a volatile issue in the past and the 
source of much rivalry between India and Pakistan. 
Maintaining a “posture of ambiguity,” Israel is 
suspected of having nuclear capabilities, but the small state 
has neither confirmed nor denied the weapons’ existence.54  
Israel, according to Yair Evron, a professor of political 
science at Tel Aviv University, has demonstrated “self 
restraint and caution” through its responsible use of nuclear 
policy and its lack of “coercive diplomacy.”55  Recently, 
however, Israel’s threats to preemptively strike Iran in the 
spring of 2012 threatened relations between Israel, the 
United States, and Iran. The United States, as an ally of 
Israel, found itself in a difficult position.  Although the 
United States has been active in trying to remove Iran’s 
nuclear weaponization program, could policymakers support 
a preemptive attack on an otherwise legitimate and stable 
state?  The U.S. decided that it would support Israel based 
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upon loyalty owed to the alliance, but policymakers have 
thus far done everything possible to prevent such an attack 
by the Israelis.  
Concerning Israel, the United States must be aware 
of the small state’s perceived security environment. While 
Israel has thus far proven to be a dependable and restrained 
ally, it also sees a very real existential threat in the official 
policies of several of its neighbors. Therefore, it may be 
willing to take certain deterrent actions that the United States 
would not otherwise support. Proliferation is not a concern, 




The growth of extremist non-state actors is the 
primary reason that the risk of nuclear attack, not necessarily 
nuclear war, has increased dramatically in the 21st century. 
Such groups, state-sponsored or not, do not represent a 
defined territory or population. For example, the extremist 
jihadist group al- Qaeda uses terrorism to achieve their goal 
of restoring fundamental Islamic law globally and defeating 
the United States. Terrorism as a tactic looks to affect a state 
by mobilizing that state’s population through fear. These 
organizations constantly seek bigger ways to paralyze a 
nation with fear and force a policy shift. Look no further than 
the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11th, 
2001. 
 Non-state actors are unique because they exist 
outside of the state paradigm. In attacking al- Qaeda, the 
United States cannot bomb its cities, invade its lands, or use 
direct political pressure through economic sanctions. The 
U.S. has found effective ways of combating non-state actors, 
such as violent extremist and terrorist groups, through 
conventional means, but no acceptable nuclear alternatives 
exist. While a bunker-buster type of nuclear tipped explosive 
would be productive in attacking extensive cave networks, 
such an attack would need to be executed on the soil of 
115Journal of Politics & Society
another sovereign state. What, then, would be an acceptable 
response to a non-state actor’s use of a nuclear weapon 
against a U.S. city?  There can be no Cold War doctrine of 
“massive retaliation” or nuclear strike against a landless 
enemy. Additionally, the paradigm of the non-state actor, 
especially a violent extremist group, makes them impervious 
to the attempts at deterrence by states. An extremist group 
intent on committing an attack does not care about its 
victim’s nuclear capability or second-strike forces. 
America’s strategic goal of deterring nuclear attacks, then, is 
obsolete against a non-state actor without territoriality. 
  
CAN THE U.S. MEET ITS STRATEGIC GOALS WITHOUT 
NUCLEAR ICBMs? 
 
 According to Theodore Caplow, the nuclear security 
environment is more stable than ever before. He argues that, 
“The classic problem of abolishing international war is 
nearly solved, although nobody seems to notice. . . For the 
first time in history, major geopolitical goals are being 
reached by international consensus with no application or 
threat of force.”56  The discussion on whether or not war 
itself is ending is beyond the scope of this argument, but the 
current nuclear security environment is at a level of 
unprecedented stability and security. While we can credit the 
work of past and current policymakers for achieving such 
stability, U.S. nuclear strategy cannot be static because the 
threats facing the United States are dynamic and 
continuously evolving. With the balance of nuclear forces 
favoring the traditional nuclear powers, the United States 
should take advantage of such a moment to prepare for 
tomorrow’s security threats. Such is the basic premise of 
deterrence – prevent future threats by preparing today’s force 
posture and strategy.  
As stated earlier, the effectiveness of nuclear 
deterrence depends on the administration’s ability to deliver 
both reliability of attack and political willingness to execute 
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such an attack. The current nuclear triad and maintenance of 
ICBMs as a nuclear delivery method exist to support the first 
prong of deterrence – reliability of the attack. The U.S. must 
be capable of delivering a lethal and accurate nuclear strike 
on an enemy target. Throughout the Cold War, nuclear 
bombers, missiles, and submarines offered a balance of 
flexibility, survivability, payload, and accuracy of fire. No 
single delivery method could provide all four assurances; so 
all three were maintained to ensure the overall nuclear force 
could assure reliability. The current rationale behind 
maintaining the nuclear triad, as opposed to reducing it to a 
dyad, is that the three delivery methods offer the same 
assurances as before. As the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 
states, “Retaining all three Triad legs will best maintain 
strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against 
potential technical problems or vulnerabilities.”57  However, 
if the United States could maintain its deterrent capability 
while still providing reliability and political willingness 
without one of the triad legs, then its removal would be 
necessary to support further strategic goals, such as 
nonproliferation. 
Strategic policymakers have been aware of the 
vulnerabilities of the nuclear ICBM force since the 1970s, 
but the possibility of an enemy eliminating the ICBM leg of 
the United States through an attack would be 
“momentous.”58  At the time of the Cold War, the question 
was centered on losing land-based nuclear assets only 
through an attack by the Soviet Union, but even then, 
Lawrence Freedman states that loss or removal of ICBMs 
“was more than compensated for by the other two legs 
(bombers and SLBMs), which, even somewhat depleted 
themselves, would still be capable of delivering a powerful 
retaliatory blow.”59  Policy makers, concerned with both 
credibility and reliability, worried that if the ICBM force 
were to be taken out, the remaining two legs would be more 
vulnerable to attack. However, this argument discounts the 
natural survivability of the bombers and SLBMs. Because 
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nuclear ICBMs are land-based assets, attackers have a 
greater probability of successfully eliminating them with a 
strike due to several reasons. First, a missile silo is a set 
location. That location is more likely to be discovered by an 
enemy than the perpetually moving locations of bombers and 
SLBMs. If another actor, most likely a state, wishes to make 
an offensive first strike against the U.S., it will only commit 
to that attack if it perceives that it would eliminate a 
significant amount of U.S. nuclear assets in order to 
minimize the effects of a U.S. counterattack. Land-based 
nuclear ICBMs are the most visible, immobile, and naturally 
indefensible asset to strike. Although air and sea-based assets 
may still exist, the enemy’s perception of success or injury 
will play a significant role in the decision to strike. Since 
deterrence aims to affect the enemy’s thought process and 
decision-making cycle, the removal of land-based nuclear 
ICBMs would have a palpable effect on the willingness of a 
state to launch a nuclear strike on the United States. 
A missile silo does allow for a vivid signal to a 
domestic and an international audience.  
Nuclear ICMB forces are kept at the ready, signaling that the 
United States can launch a strike within minutes at any point 
in time. However, the downfall of keeping these missiles at 
full notice is similar to an on/off switch – policymakers and 
military strategists have no room for escalation. Although 
conventional missiles without their nuclear payload can be 
tested from time to time, U.S. signaling power has actually 
been diminished because, unlike bombers, a nuclear missile 
cannot increase its threatening appearance during situational 
circumstances. The missiles are always at full readiness. 
Though sending the message of “always ready” certainly has 
its own merits, it also limits the flexibility of the President in 
responding to various situations. ICBMs, then, may actually 
negate a flexible response as desired by decision makers. 
Because active nuclear land-based missiles have existed in 
U.S. policy for decades, the removal of the nuclear ICBM 
force may prove to have very little effect on potential 
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enemies. And because the United States also always keeps its 
other nuclear legs at the ready, the credibility of a nuclear 
strike is still present. What would be removed is the 
guarantee of a massive retaliatory strike.  
On the topic of massive retaliation via land-based 
ICBMs, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger 
questions the worth of instant access to such a massive 
response capability in the case of “anything approximate to a 
disarming first strike against the United States.”60  He 
discusses the President’s need for an immediate link to a 
massive retaliatory force: 
 
But such a development could bring into question our 
ability to respond to attacks in a controlled, selective, 
and deliberate fashion. It could also give the Soviets 
a capability that we ourselves would lack, and it 
could bring into question the sense of equality that 
the principles of Vladivostok so explicitly endorse. 
Worst of all, it could arouse precisely the fears and 
suspicions that our arms control efforts are designed 
to dispel.61 
 
The United States would only need a massive retaliatory 
response against an actor possessing extensive resources 
itself, such as a state – most likely a legitimate state such as 
Russia or China, both of which have substantial nuclear 
capabilities. However, as Schlesinger and Freedman have 
noted, the use of such a capability would undermine any 
intermediary or regulatory institutions in place to prevent 
nuclear annihilation. Additionally, in the case of entering into 
a conflict with another state, U.S. doctrine favors 
conventional methods of achieving peace, stability, and 
survival. Maintaining ICBMs, but replacing the nuclear 
payload with an advanced conventional payload would better 
nest the capability within the conventional military force 
structure. By removing nuclear ICBMs, the U.S. would 
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maintain a nuclear option and expand conventional options 
without significantly affecting the state’s use of warfare.  
 Land-based nuclear ICBMs provided the United 
States with access to static targets nearly anywhere in the 
world and allowed the President an immediate retaliatory 
attack capability. During the development of the triad, 
ICBMs were a counterforce asset, meaning that they could 
focus on a specific target with unparalleled accuracy. With 
the less-accurate early bombers and SLBMs, also considered 
counterforce assets, accuracy was not necessarily guaranteed, 
but a broad targeting area would heighten the 
unpredictability of the U.S. threat.  However, with 
improvements in the technological capabilities of bombers 
and SLBMs, the threats that only ICMBs could meet can 
now be addressed without the land-based leg. Coupled with 
an increased emphasis on deliberate attacks and regulatory 
institutions, the president no longer needs instant access to 
nuclear ICBMs because the other two legs offer similar, 
more adaptive responses. Reliability and credibility, then, 
could still be maintained with only a nuclear dyad. 
 But how would a dyad stand against the four modern 
threat actors discussed earlier?  While enmeshed in treaties, 
talks, and international institutions, Russia and China still 
represent a conventional, great power threat to the United 
States. Deterrence was a strategic doctrine meant to defend 
the U.S. against other states, so credibility and operational 
reliability are still necessary. Russia still possesses the 
nuclear capability to bring the U.S. into a great-power 
nuclear war, and that threat continues to significantly impact 
U.S. nuclear policy and strategy. However, as discussed, the 
removal of the ICBM force structure would have little impact 
on the operational capabilities of the U.S. nuclear force 
structure. The remaining nuclear assets would still be able to 
combat these large state threats with payload, survivability, 
flexibility, and accuracy. To rogue states such as Iran and 
North Korea, military signaling, both nuclear and 
conventional, is necessary and effective. The United States 
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needs to control the escalation of its signaling based on the 
situation because of Iran and North Korea’s shared tendency 
to change threat levels unexpectedly and often within very 
short spans of time. In regional conflicts, such as that 
between India and Pakistan, the composition of the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal would have little impact. The best way to 
combat the instability in the southeast Asia region through 
deterrence would be through the conventional forces already 
in the area. By keeping a presence in the region, as well as 
actively working with both India and Pakistan to reduce 
internal and nuclear program instability or vulnerabilities 
while bringing them under international nuclear regulation 
institutions, the United States can reduce the possibility of a 
regional conflict through nuclear attacks. As for the internal 
instability, presence of non-state actors, and lack of 
transparency and security within Pakistan, the United States 
would have little impact by rattling a massive retaliatory 
saber based on ICBMs. If the primary concern is the central 
government’s lack of control, simply threatening that 
government would not address the main threatening factors – 
non-state actors and a lack of security around nuclear 
facilities. The risk of a non-state actor acquiring a nuclear 
weapon and then targeting the United States or an ally is 
considered one of the greatest threats to the United States. 
The fear, however, comes from the uncertainty of such an 
attack. Nuclear deterrence as a doctrine has little to no effect 
on non-state actors because deterrence is fundamentally a 
physical threat. If an actor has very few physical assets, 
infrastructure, or territoriality, then the threat of a nuclear 
strike will have little impact on a non-state actor’s decision-
making cycle.  
 By prioritizing realistic operational capacity and 
deterrent signaling above the need to triple balance the 
nuclear triad, U.S. policy makers could restructure the 
nuclear force program in order to balance resources and 
assets. The nuclear force structure would still be capable of 
effectively upholding deterrence by continuing to provide 
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reliability and credibility while removing land-based 
vulnerabilities and focusing on the operational roles of the 
various nuclear delivery systems within the modern security 
environment. 
 
Forwarding the Nonproliferation Movement 
 
 The Obama administration has indicated that, other 
than maintaining a sufficient deterrent strategy for security, 
nonproliferation remains a major policy goal. The 2010 
Nuclear Posture Review stated that nonproliferation 
addresses the fundamental issue of nuclear weapons – their 
existence. Wishing to prevent both an accidental attack from 
a state and an intentional nuclear attack from a terrorist group 
or other non-state actor, the most basic answer to preventing 
both is to eliminate the availability of the weapons and, as 
logically follows, the opportunity to deploy them. Both the 
U.S. and Russia, who possess the two greatest nuclear 
arsenals, have identified reducing the availability and 
proliferation of nuclear weapons as a common priority.  
 The non-proliferation and nuclear-zero movements 
depend on international institutions and organizations to 
regulate and make transparent states’ nuclear behaviors. 
Liberal institutionalism holds that treaties such as the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty, the SORT and START initiatives, and the 
establishment of the International Atomic Energy 
Association can bind states to certain rules, while also 
depending on other states to regulate and reinforce one 
another’s behavior. The movement depends on transparency 
and on states following through with actions that would 
otherwise be seen as detrimental to their individual 
sovereignty for the pursuit of a larger, common goal of 
nuclear security. 
 The removal of the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear 
triad would cut over 450 nuclear weapons from the 
international environment, as well as provide a strong signal 
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to other states to make strategic cuts to their own nuclear 
force structures, instead of simply making minor cuts over 
decades. Cutting the ICBM program would also signal to 
other states that the United States views such capability as 
less strategically valuable than other platforms. Such a signal 
could dissuade other states from pursuing the symbolic 
strength of missile programs. 
 The United States has several options available to 
proceed with disarming its nuclear ICBM capability. 
Policymakers must remember that enhancing the 
international nonproliferation regime is a major factor in 
disarming ICBMs, so appropriate caution must be taken in 
involving the international community. While the U.S. could 
disarm the missiles itself as a unilateral show of good will 
and initiative, involving other nuclear weapons states in the 
process, either through the creation of a new institution or by 
updating current standards, could compound the benefits to 
both the U.S. and the nonproliferation movement as a whole. 
While few other states may be ready to make such a move, 
considering additional U.S. capabilities are another key 
factor in this policy decision, transparency and involvement 
are critical in modern global diplomacy and policy actions. 
The critical variable in the current debate, however, 
is in balancing limited resources. The United States finds 
itself in a security environment where deterrence, while still 
necessary and effective in many cases, may not be effective 
against every threat, namely non-state actors, An updated 
security strategy, therefore, may be necessary to reduce the 
role of deterrence in resource allocation and to expand 
resources and policy options to best meet modern threats. In 
the future, flexibility with policy options will be more 
important than flexibility with conducting nuclear strikes. 
From this perspective, cutting an antiquated strike option in 
order to allow for advanced updates to the other legs is viable 
and necessary.  
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Risks and Alternatives 
 
 As in every policy and defense decision, the possible 
risks in removing America’s ICBM program are numerous. 
There is no question that in disarming all nuclear ICBMs, the 
U.S. would be voluntarily removing a powerful and unique 
instrument of war. Such an action would seem impossible 
under the theory of realism – no self-interested state would 
actively decrease its own power. This policy decision is only 
possible under theories that recognize the opportunity for an 
enlightened self-interest. The nuclear ICBM still represents 
an unparalleled military asset, and the United States would 
hardly be considered weaker by maintaining an ICBM force 
if the U.S. had unlimited resources. In reality, however, 
national strategists need to balance limited resources with 
political goals, meaning that both weapons capabilities and 
political objectives need to be prioritized. Removing the 
nuclear ICBM force is one option available in the mid to 
long-term in order to eliminate the nuclear threat globally. 
Alternatives in policy options, especially when considering a 
positive, proactive step such as this, do exist and may appeal 
to various policy sects more convincingly than would the 
removal of nuclear ICBMs.  
Other options include reducing each leg in time, as 
the SORT and START treaties have done, or, if one leg must 
be eliminated, cutting the expensive bomber program 
instead. Land-based nuclear ICBMs, while perpetually on 
call, do provide the greatest decision-making time for the 
president if a nuclear strike is called for, either as a first or 
retaliatory strike. Additionally, they are accurate, 
inexpensive, and require the least amount of logistical and 
tactical planning for mobilization. Although SLBMs and 
bombers still provide reliability, ICBMs increase military 
strike options in a time of crisis.  
Another risk is the ability of a foreign enemy 
successfully exposing an imbalance in the survivability or 
accuracy of the new dyad. The U.S. would lose a significant 
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capacity of its massive retaliation means. ICBMs were cheap 
and required the least expensive and complex upkeep, 
making them ideal to stockpile in the case of a massive 
strike. Submarines and bombers cannot match the 
immediacy, synchronization, and sheer scale of a coordinated 
missile attack. Even so, the U.S. would still possess nearly 
400 deployed nuclear warheads on submarines alone.62  
However, the other legs of the dyad, as well as through the 
continued use of regional or intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles, could mitigate the risk of attack from an enemy 
actor. In short, the bombers and submarines are most likely 
to survive, thus decreasing an enemy’s incentive to strike 
aggressively because of the uncertainty in effectively 
destroying U.S. nuclear capabilities. If an adversary strikes, 
but does not destroy the United States’ ability to retaliate, 
then that adversary will suffer a highly destructive 
punishment for their aggression. Additionally, the continental 
United States would be safer from attack because of the 
raised cost of targeting. If the United States removes physical 
military target points from within its borders, with our 
nuclear platforms remaining hidden in port, offshore, or 
airborne locations, an enemy actor would be forced to 
consider civilian or infrastructural targets as alternatives. 
While this would not deter a non-state actor or even some 
other states in the case of actual nuclear war, the cost of a 
massive strike on U.S. domestic soil is raised by virtue of an 
international norm against targeting civilian sectors. An 
enemy will be less likely to use a nuclear attack against a 
civilian target than against an isolated military post. 
Adhering to such principles, though, may actually serve to 
undermine deterrence and the executive’s response 
flexibility. If the United States were to avoid targeting 
civilian centers, enemy actors may twist U.S. principles by 
storing major assets in those civilian centers.  
The United States also risks the appearance of 
weakness internationally with the reduction or elimination of 
one leg of the triad. Although the United States would see 
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such a move as having a marginal impact on operation and 
signaling capabilities, such a policy decision could signal to 
the rest of the world that the United States’ economic woes 
are so great that they have impacted the very core of U.S. 
strength – the nuclear arsenal. Although reducing nuclear 
stockpiles through treaties has no such impact, a sudden 
move, such as the unilateral removal of nuclear ICBMs, 
could be seen as an act of last resort or desperation. 
Controlling the perceptions of enemy and possible enemy 
actors is crucial in maintaining deterrence as a strategic 
doctrine. 
In a democratic state such as the United States, where 
national perceptions of security rely so heavily on 
technological and military advantages, the public is unlikely 
to take the step of removing ICBMs as a capability unless 
forced into an economic position whereby other, more 
important means and goals were at stake. Discussion of the 
removal of the ICBM force is still marginal amongst 
Congress and the president. The two actors most likely to 
fight the removal of the ICBM force are the Air Force’s 
missile operators and specialists, and the president. The 
opposition of the missile operators and specialists would be 
expected, but the president’s opposition would be based on 
power. Arguably, the ICBM is the weapons system most 
directly connected to the president himself. The lines of 
logistical and command barriers are significantly fewer 
between the president and a missile silo than they are 
between the president and a bomber or submarine. While the 
ICBM force has little operational capacity in the modern age, 
any bureaucracy is unlikely to give up the most powerful tool 
directly under its command, unless alternative systems are 
developed to guarantee the power of the president over 
national defense. Removing nuclear ICBMs would decrease 
the absolute power of the United States, even if only 
marginally, but the cost of keeping the system running, from 
expenditures to opportunity costs and vulnerability, may 
reduce U.S. power even more, though in a less tangible way. 
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The nature of a democracy, which is subject to deliberative 
policymaking and restrictive term limits, may keep 
policymakers from suffering a tangible reduction instead of 
an intangible, but more serious, reduction. 
Finally, the ICBM leg of the triad has been most 
valued for two capabilities: immediacy, which has been 
addressed thoroughly, and permanence. An ICBM, once 
built, can last for decades with minimal maintenance. 
Bombers and submarines require more frequent upkeep in 
order to remain at operational capacity. These systems are 
more complex and more dynamic, which give the bomber 
and the submarine an advantage in terms of technology and 
survivability, but serve as a disadvantage to permanence. The 
permanence of nuclear ICBMs, however, is in the ICBM, not 
the nuclear warhead. Transitioning to a force of conventional 
ICBMs would maintain the permanence of the technology 
while removing it from the nuclear discussion. The 
permanence of the technology would actually be extended 
because the nuclear payload has a shorter expiration date 
than any other piece of the structure. The nuclear update 
costs could then be focused on the SLBMs and bombers. 
Many policy makers will prefer to simply reduce 
each leg of the triad equally instead of applying all budgetary 
cuts to a single leg. However, as discussed earlier, an 
updated nuclear security strategy must allow the executive 
more policy options actionable through dialogue and 
diplomacy. The United States could maintain the status quo 
while upholding their end of the new START treaty, or it 
could expand the president’s policy options by opening new 
international discussions. Current non-nuclear missile 
defense shields are capable of defending against enemy 
nuclear missile strikes, and conventional ICBMs can still 
send a powerful threat to other nations. Simply removing 
nuclear warheads from existing ICBMs would allow the 
president to maintain effective national security and 
deterrence policy while opening new diplomatic roads in 
discussing the future of the international nuclear regime. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Removing the use of nuclear ICBMs is a means-
based answer to the problem of adjusting the U.S. nuclear 
force posture to reflect the security environment of the 21st 
century.63  With the greater interdependency among states, 
the greater availability and strength of international 
institutions and organizations, and the greater capabilities of 
nuclear SLBMs and bombers, the United States is ready to 
rebalance its Cold War nuclear infrastructure to better fight 
the increased risk of nuclear attack by rogue non-state actors 
while maintaining a deterrent and operational force against 
more traditional threats. The strategic ends, ways, and means 




1 Justin Fishel, “Panetta Goes Nuclear on Budget Talks,” Fox News Online, 
November 15, 2011 (http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2011/11/15/panetta-goes-
nuclear-budget-talks). 
2 Admiral Mike Mullen, as quoted by Mary Kaszynski, “Nuclear Budget 
Cuts Gaining Momentum,” Ploughshares Fund Blog, November 17, 2011 
(http://www.ploughshares.org/blog/2011-11-17/nuclear-budget-cuts-gaining). 
3 General James Cartwright, as quoted by Mary Kaszynski, “Nuclear Budget 
Cuts Gaining Momentum”. 
4 Brigadier General John Adams (Ret.), “Let’s Seize the Opportunity to 
Take Control of Defense Spending,” The Hill’s Congress Blog, August 26, 2011 
(http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/178311-lets-seize-the-
opportunity-to-take-control-of-defense-spending). 
5 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (Washington D.C., 2010), 
6. 
6 Hans M. Kristensen, “United States Discloses Size of Nuclear Weapons 
Stockpile”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, May 3, 2010 
(http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/05/stockpilenumber.php). 
7 Nuclear Posture Review, x. 
8 Ibid, 22. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid, 23. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Stew Magnuson, “Could the Nuclear Triad Become a ‘Bi-ad?’,” National 







15 “Fact Sheet:  Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons 
Stockpile”, Department of Defense, May 3, 2010 
(http://www.defense.gov/news/d20100503stockpile.pdf). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Joseph Cirincione, “Obama’s Nuclear Future: The Battle to Reduce the 
U.S. Nuclear Stockpile Begins,” Foreign Affairs, March 6, 2013 
(http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139037/joseph-cirincione/obamas-nuclear-
future). 
18 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Nuclear Posture 
Review, 111 Cong., 2d sess. S. Rept. (Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Defense, 2010). 
19 The White House, “The Agenda, Foreign Policy,” Whitehouse.gov 
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy). 
20 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” speech, 
Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009 
(http://www.whitehouse.gove/the_press_office/ Remarsk-by-President-Barack-Obama-
in-Prague-as-Delivered). 
21  Nuclear Posture Review, 3. 
22 Graham Allison and Douglas Dillon, “Saving the NPT and the 
Nonproliferation Regime in an Era of Nuclear Renaissance” (testimony to the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2008), 2. 
23 Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 
21st Century (London: Routledge, 2010), 146. 
24 Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (New York: Yale Institute of 
International Studies, 1946), 76. 
25 Bernard Brodie, "8", "The Anatomy of Deterrence", Strategy in the 
Missile Age (Princeton, 1959), 264–304. 
26 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of 
American National Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005),146. 
27 Nuclear Posture Review, 43. 
28 Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism:  
American Foreign Policy Since 1938, 4th Ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), this 
paragraph synthesizes chapter 7, 116-131. 
29 Gaddis, 45. 
30 Ibid, 145. 
31 Ibid, 146. 
32 Ibid, 164. 
33 Ibid, 183. 
34 Nuclear Posture Review, 3. 
35 Cimbala, Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation in the Twenty-First 
Century, 148. 
36 David E. Sanger and Peter Baker, “Obama Linits When U.S. Would Use 
Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times Online, 5 April 2010 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/06arms.html?sq=Obama no first 
use&st=cse&adxnnl=1&scp=1&pagewanted=1&adxnnlx=1323446637-
Z7yWCIlgLA2kxjTfIPcOog). 
37 Cimbala, Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation in the Twenty-First 
Century, 3. 
38 “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Arms 
Control Association, updated January/February 2003 
(http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_01-02/document_janfeb03). 
129Journal of Politics & Society
 
39 Stephen Fidler, “Over Dinner, Putin Takes Issue With Western Powers,” 
The Wall Street Journal Online, November 12, 2011 
(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204358004577032533741783056.htm
l). 
40 Nuclear Posture Review, 4. 
41 Ibid, 5. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Jianqun Teng, “A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy,” Nuclear 
Doctrines and Strategies (Amsterdam:  IOS Press, 2008), 82-84, paraphrased. 
44 Therese Delpech, Iran and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007), 5. 
45 Ibid, 9-15. 
46 Ibid, 9. 
47 John Mearshiemer, interview with the author (West Point, NY, January 
23, 2012). 
48 Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman, The Nuclear Express 
(Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2010), 261. 
49 Delpech, 71-73. 
50 Rajesh M. Basrur, “India’s Nuclear Arsenal:  Prospects for Enlargement,” 
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies (edited by Mark Fitzpatrick, et. al, Amsterdam: IOS 
Press, 2007), 130-131. 
51 Ibid, 131. 
52 Ibid, 130. 
53 As quoted in David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistani Nuclear Arms 
Pose Challenge to U.S. Policy,” The New York Times Online, 31 January 2011 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/world/asia/01policy.html?pagewanted=all). 
54 Yari Evron, “Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons,” Nuclear Doctrines 
and Strategies: National Policies and International Security (edited by Mark Fitzpatrick, 
et. al., Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2007), 122. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Theodore Caplow, Forbidden Wars: The Unwritten Rules that Keep Us 
Safe (New York: University Press of America, 2007), 98. 
57  Nuclear Posture Review, 21. 
58 Colin Gray, The Future of Land-Based Missile Forces (London: IISS, 
1978), 1. 
59 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Great Britain: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 370. 
60 James R. Schlesinger, Defense Department Report of FY 1976, 1-16 (as 
found in Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 373). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Kristensen. 
63 Ibid. 
